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Angela Last 
Re-reading Worldliness: Hannah Arendt & the Question of 
Matter 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Geography has greatly benefitted from a dialogue with materialism, whether of the 
‘historical’ or of the ‘new materialist’2 description. Historical materialism has sensitised 
geographers to the material dimension of inequality and socio-economic relations, 
whereas ‘new materialism’ has introduced a concern with the nonhuman for other than 
(purely) human ends. A key problem within materialism has always been the degree 
with which theories draw on scientific theories of matter or conceptualise the physical 
world. Are we materially set up to perform in a certain way, or do material processes 
not affect human culture in such immediately corresponding ways? How much do we – 
or should we - read matter3?  
 
Because of such preoccupations, materialism has been accused of leading to bad 
political consequences by default, whether in theory or practice. In geography, this fear 
of matter in politics has, for instance, manifested in the concern about a ‘re-
materialisation’ of geopolitics, the latter having been brought on by the realisation that 
anthropogenic climate change and material destruction may somehow be connected to 
socio-cultural dynamics (Dalby, 2007; Weizman, 2010). By contrast, the advocacy of a 
‘re-materialisation’ of cultural geography has seen fewer obstacles, as the subfield has 
increasingly become regarded as apolitical. Despite their different levels of opposition to 
materialism, then, both cases reflect the cliché that matter is ‘nothing’ and has, or 
should have, nothing to do with politics (see Lenin, 1977: 190). According to this 
dismissive view, materialism continues to be attractive, because of its incredible 
possibilities for misuse, including the relegation of agency from individual humans to the 
nonhuman, and the openness of matter to any reading the reader may wish to project 
upon it.  
 
Like historical materialism previously, new materialisms such as actor-network-theory, 
object orientated ontologies in general, enchanted and affective materialisms have 
been accused of leading to ‘bad politics’ (Fuller, 2000; Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004). 
Apparently forgetting populations that have been ‘thing-ed for eons’ (Ed Atkins in Apter 
et al, 2016: 7), they have attracted a reputation for being incapable of theorising crucial 
human (and even nonhuman) dynamics such as inequality, difference, violence and self-
destructive behaviour (Clark, 2011; Fuller, 2000: 11, 23; Harding, 2008: 122), topics that 
would warrant and validate their inclusion in the realm of political geography. Worse, 
inside and outside of academia, the new materialist theories continue to appear as ‘feel 
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good materialisms’ that distract from the problematic alliances they make. Ostensibly 
seeking to inspire ways out of previous theoretical gridlocks by de-centering the human, 
they instead lead to questionable economic alliances with the entertainment and 
defence industry, in the form of banal art installations and coffee table books4.   
 
Likewise, the ‘darker’, geophilosophy-affiliated new materialisms have been accused of 
leading to feelings of powerlessness or nihilism. What is a precariously permeable 
matter-energy manifestation to do? Manuel De Landa’s ‘call for a more experimental 
attitude toward reality and for an increased awareness of the potential for self-
organisation inherent in even the humblest forms of matter-energy’ (1997: 273) seems 
as overly optimistic as Ray Brassier’s nod to ‘species being’ as a unifying identity ‘that 
staves off the divisive identifications of individuality, ethnicity, nationality’ (2014). For 
many politically minded geographers, the even less ‘instructive’ side of geophilosophy is 
even less useful, or rather trying too hard to be cool to be useful, with its apparent 
fetishisation of human extinction or certain types of matter, including fossils, obsidian, 
soil, rot, slime and other objects of gothic appeal (e.g. Negarestani, 2010; Woodard 
2012). This preference for ‘dark matter’ has prompted the question whether 
‘geophilosophy’ is merely an aesthetic project or a genuine challenge to dematerialised 
thought or to the ‘cutesy reflexive things’ of STS (Wyatt, 2014).  
 
Because of such perceived failures, new materialisms have become regarded as either a 
poor successor to historical materialism – anaemic versions of the ‘full-blooded’ 
materialisms (Castree, 2002: 113) - or an outright antithesis. At the same time, historical 
materialism has also been diagnosed as a problem. In relation to the material conditions 
of life, it has been, for example, considered outdated for adhering to an decidedly 
inappropriate humanism (Whatmore, 1997), and for failing to deal with the shock of the 
nonhuman ability to upset human relations of production (Provost-Smith, 2015). 
Although there have been attempts to bring the two materialisms into dialogue with 
one another (Castree, 2002; Haraway, 2004; Kirsch & Mitchell, 2004; Stengers, 2011; 
Swyngedouw, 1996), their politics continue to be perceived as mutually exclusive, 
because of their different approaches to economic production and social relations.  
 
Despite their different appeal, both strands of materialism are not that dissimilar in 
their questions towards matter, for instance, in their drive to challenge established 
hierarchies and dynamics, and to move beyond individualisation of social problems. It is 
such ‘common enemies’ that make it worth persisting that there is, indeed, a basis for 
dialogue, despite the mutual mistrust about political value, aesthetics and effectiveness. 
There are, of course, multiple paths towards such a dialogue. The one pursued in this 
article, discontinuing the ‘us versus them’ polemic so far, is less interested in comparing 
and dismantling seemingly antagonistic examples of historical and new materialisms, 
but to ask a more fundamental question: Why do we need an attention to matter in 
geography – and in politics - in the first place? The answer, I hope, will help in drawing 
out one set of common sensitivities that may serve as a basis for dialogue.  
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To tackle this question, I intend turn to a bit of an unusual place: the work of Hannah 
Arendt. Arendt may strike the reader as a curious choice for a discussion of matter: not 
only has she been conspicuously absent from geographical discussions of materiality 
(and even space), but also she is known as a strong critic of materialism and science. 
However, it is exactly this scepticism of matter and of de-individualisation that I would 
like to utilise in a ‘devil’s advocate’ move. What makes Arendt’s work particularly 
valuable, in my view, is the author’s sensitivity to totalitarian tendencies that manifests 
in her strong distrust of materialism’s deindividuating tendency – a move that always 
seems on the brink of leading to further dehumanisation. For Arendt, humans have 
material bodies that make them specifically human. This specificity is put into danger by 
materialisms that have a tendency to (re)unite human bodies it with other matter. Yet 
Arendt also acknowledges that it is impossible to entirely separate the human from 
matter: while she generally has a very negative attitude towards the encroachment of 
matter on human affairs, she is not interested in establishing simplistic boundaries 
either. She sets out careful rules where matter is appropriate and where not, for 
instance, in her conceptualisation of the public-private boundary.  
 
Arendt is further interesting because of her persistent dialogue with the scientific 
developments of her time and with the cultural reactions towards them. Quantum 
mechanics, the theory of relativity and the space programme all feature in her analyses 
(2006: 48-9; 1998: 13). For instance, she maintained that the disjuncture between 
everyday human perception and scientific perception – starting with the discovery of 
heliocentrism – created a profound world alienation (2006: 54). Another relevant 
dialogue – amongst her many philosophical influences8 - took place with historical 
materialism. Like many authors of the interwar and postwar period, Hannah Arendt was 
dissatisfied with historical and dialectical materialism, but tried to constructively engage 
with it, despite her concerns about its role in the formation of totalitarian regimes.    
 
Of particular interest for geographers is also Arendt’s extensive use of the ‘world’ as a 
space and concept. Few people are aware that Hannah Arendt’s famous book ‘The 
Human Condition’ was originally going to be called ‘Amor Mundi: Love of the World’ 
(Young Bruehl, 2004: xxiv). With the rise of new materialisms, the ‘world’ appears to 
have fallen out of favour as an unwieldy, amorphous entity that contains too many 
indistinctive human-nonhuman constellations to be of any use. More recently, however, 
an interest in the ‘world’ as a concept has resurfaced in recent debates in geography, 
which constructively seek to question its usefulness, both as a discipline-defining 
concept and as a wider theoretical and political intervention (Gibson-Graham, 2008; 
Shaw, 2010; Wainwright, 2010). Of particular interest in this paper is, as Ian Shaw 
phrases it, the ‘attack on the gap between those that are included but do not 
belong to a world’ (2010: 440). Here, material hierarchies play a key role.  
 
Against the background of recent nature-culture debates, Hannah Arendt’s distinction 
between earth and world may appear disturbingly unfashionable and unoriginal. As I 
will try to show in this article, this accusation is justified – in fact, it leads Arendt to some 
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extremely alarming conclusions - but it is also not, because of the kind of analysis that it 
enables Arendt to perform: an analysis of the dynamics of dehumanisation. Further, the 
earth-world distinction is not only key to her intervention in materialism, but also to 
conceptualising ‘worldliness’ as a political attitude. In this article, ‘worldliness’ is being 
offered as a critical tool, but also itself subject to critique, in order to ask questions 
about the effect of exclusion of particular kinds of matter. What I attempt to show is 
how an Arendtian lens on materialism can not only draw out problems with current 
hostilities to materialism, but I can also identify common political concerns where 
dialogue can be established.  
 
 
1 Arendt’s Division Between Earth and World 
 
In order to gain an idea of Hannah Arendt’s position towards materialism, it is necessary 
to start with her key division between earth and world. This distinction is also crucial for 
understanding of her worldview, which is based on a balance between the two. While 
Arendt generally has a more nested vision of material spaces and encounters9, it is 
essentially her envisioned dynamic between earth and world that seems to give rise to 
these further distinctions. In Arendt’s work, the earth represents the material realm, 
whereas the world represents what humans do with it - ‘the man-made home erected 
on earth and made of the material which earthly nature delivers into human hands, [and 
which] consists not of things that are consumed but of things that are used’ (1998: 134). 
However, the world is not just fabricated stuff, but also that which ‘lies between 
people’, an ‘interspace’ (1993, 3; 13). This separation of earth and world drives an 
interplay of forces that work both together and against one another, continuously 
shaping human life.  
 
In this dynamic, matter stands for permanence and immortality, the material guarantee 
for the continuity of human life, while human life is characterised by fragility and 
plasticity (2006: 48; 1998: 134). This is, of course, not unproblematic, as geographers 
such as Nigel Clark have shown in their argument for a more volatile imaginary of nature 
(Clark, 2011). For Arendt, the idea of the natural permanence is important because it 
makes any desire to build a ‘common world’ possible: ‘without this transcendence into a 
potential earthly immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no common world and no 
public realm is possible’ (1998: 55). If people assume that ‘the world will not last’, they 
withdraw from the public sphere. At the same time, Arendt also recognises the 
probabilistic essence of the ‘processes in the universe and in nature’ when she discusses 
the ‘miraculous’ origins of human life against all odds and the lingering presence of the 
miraculous within the everyday (2006: 168). As part of her analysis, she contrasts the 
‘shock of surprise’ that humans feel at this realisation about their near-impossibility 
with the ‘man-made’ wonders and coincidences of human history (2006: 168-169). In 
both cases, she emphasises the accidental, the improbable that is present in anything 
from the depths of the cosmos to everyday life. However, she makes one tentative 
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distinction: as beings capable of action, despite our incomplete control, we have a 
greater chance of influencing outcomes. Hence Arendt’s work can be seen as a plea to 
be attentive to not only our limitations, but also to our means.  
 
In fact, for Arendt, it is crucial that being human is not a fixed condition. Her criticism of 
Marx rests mainly on his apparent belief, despite his emphasis on material evolution, in 
an essential human nature ‘for all time’ (1973a: 456)10. As Sylvie Courtine-Denamy 
points out, Arendt was but one of the interwar thinkers who constructively criticised 
Marx. In Courtine-Denamy’s comparison of Hannah Arendt and Simone Weil, she points 
out that both authors took Marx to account for his over-reliance on matter, as well as 
his utopian view of labour. For Weil, Marx replaced Hegel’s ‘hidden mind’ with matter as 
the motor of progress (2006: 43). Matter became an automatic ‘machine for 
manufacturing the good’ (Weil, 2006: 164). For Arendt, too, not only was Marx’ over-
reliance on matter problematic, but also any other conceptualisation that relied on 
matter as a motor of progress, such as in the reports of the scientists of her time. In her 
critique of science, she takes it to task for turning conscious human action and turning 
into a merely material process (Arendt, 2006: 274). It is human individuality that Arendt 
is concerned with, in terms of the agency of the individual to intervene and to create the 
conditions for good politics, something that is missing for her in Marx.  
 
Regarding her emphasis on human individuality, it could be argued that Arendt follows a 
line similar to her contemporary Bataille and his argument for supplementing 
materialism with psychoanalysis11: ‘[t]he basic error of all materialism in politics - and 
this materialism is not Marxian and not even modern in origin, but as old as our history 
of political theory – is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves 
as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon 
reaching an altogether worldly, material object’ (Arendt, 1998: 183). To identify the 
human with history and the history with progress, as in Marxism, did not work for her 
(1973a: 456). For Arendt, as philosopher Vasti Roodt puts it: “human being is 
conditioned being. In other words, being human is not an absolute state, but conditional 
upon an encounter with − and thus an openness towards − the world and its limits’ 
(Roodt, 2005: 119). It is also an openness towards matter, though of a different kind. 
Matter is what we are inevitably open to, since we are constituted by it. To gain 
humanity, we must constantly ‘humanise’ matter in order to produce a reality that sets 
us above being ‘mere matter’ (see Arendt 1993:16, 1998: 134). This is neither a process 
towards a uniform humanity, nor a fantasy of making the world more human, but a 
negotiation of the realisation that the world ‘is not in the first place ‘for us’’ (Roodt, 
2005: 207).  
 
This has the following consequence: while there is primordial matter, the matter that 
we, as humans, engage with, is never just primordial. In fact, Arendt mocks the 
‘Heisenberg man’ - referring to the quantum mechanics pioneer - ‘the man who will be 
less likely ever to meet anything but himself and man-made things the more ardently he 
wishes to eliminate all anthropocentric considerations from his encounter with the non-
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human world around him’ (2006: 272). The drive towards finding out what things are 
without us remains pointless in her view - worldliness is, as Svetlana Boym puts it, only 
interested in the ‘survival of the manmade world’ (2009: 120). No matter how much 
things affect (or remain unaffected by) us, we need to make sense of them. This is not 
something that we can do by ourselves, but we need to make sense with others (Arendt, 
1993: 31). It is these dynamics of sense-making, the constant threat of a loss of sense 
that we have to negotiate, that Arendt is concerned with. Matter cannot give us any 
answers or help us with sense-making. For the human world to function, as I will 
elaborate in the next section, matter has to be kept at bay.  
 
2 Arendt’s Paranoia: Worldliness as Boundary Policing  
 
The most controversial of Arendt’s views on matter and culture is perhaps her 
conceptualisation of politics. Her aim is to create a common world (and a politics) that 
transcends the material through pluralism. In itself, this is hardly controversial, yet as 
part of her critique of materialism, a number of issues arise. As established in the 
previous section, Arendt’s process of sense-making is under threat from both the 
material and the cultural side. Here, Arendt’s criticisms of Marxian materiality and of his 
related conception of labour and class stay central to her argument. For Arendt, as for 
Marx, material existence is associated with necessity. For Arendt, however, necessity 
negates pluralism, the key ingredient for political discourse. Material existence and 
material needs are levelling agents, rather than engines of diversity. Thus, in an 
Arendtian universe, it becomes incomprehensible that the labouring class is associated 
with the origin of change towards better politics and a more equal society. In her view, 
labour is so necessity-driven that the labourer is neither with the world nor in discourse 
with other people. The same goes for poverty in general: in another one of her 
examples, the poor, hungry masses of the French revolution were so governed by bodily 
needs and impulses that they could not produce pluralism and act politically. The result 
was a regime that was characterised by terror. In Arendt’s view, physical needs and 
deficiencies turn people univocal and into something akin to an ‘earth force’ (1973: 59 & 
114): ‘The cry for bread will always be uttered with one voice’ (1973b: 114).  
 
Arendt sees this excess of the ‘unnatural growth of the natural’ as a problem when 
labour has become the main emphasis of a society (Arendt, 1998: 47). An example 
would be today’s mass casualisation of labour, a condition that puts people into a 
constant state of anxiety about basic necessities. For her, this leaves no room for care 
for the world. While this may sound like an elitist worldview where only those who 
managed to free themselves of labour, doubtlessly by taking advantage of those who do 
it for them, can take part in politics (e.g. Arendt, 1998: 120) – hierarchy tied to material 
dependence - it also allows her to explain mechanisms that continue to strategically 
disempower poor people. Conversely, Arendt also sees a threat coming from idleness, 
both through privileged freedom from labour and through mechanisation. At the other 
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end of the spectrum, the world is threatened by the freeing of the body from necessity, 
a process that allows for an excessive growth and acceleration – in Arendt’s view, a 
proliferation of the natural that is not kept in check any longer by constant labour 
(Arendt, 1998: 47).  
 
This dual threat from the material, and from freedom from the material, also manifest 
as a problem in Arendt’s process of sense-making: while only anthropocentrism can 
produce meaning (1998: 155), the human drive to instrumentalise devalues everything 
around them into ‘a mere means to further ends’ (1998: 156, 157). The ‘world’ and its 
plurality are in constant danger of annihilation by the material on the one hand (Zerilli, 
1995: 171) and human instrumentality on the other. On the individual level, this 
translates into the ‘sheer terror associated with mortality, with having a body’ (Zerilli, 
1995: 173; 188) and the fear of ‘loss of symbolic mastery’ (Zerilli, p. 174). Worse, 
projects that are non-instrumental are not necessarily inherently good. The totalitarian 
movements and their ‘striking non-utilitarian traits’ are a case in point (Arendt, 2006: 
87).  
 
Arendt’s view of action is similarly shaped by a distinction between a homogenised or 
naturalised ‘what’ (e.g. ‘women’) and a plural ‘who’ (Arendt 1998: 181; see also Zerilli, 
1995: 181; Honig, 141-142, 153): ‘action without a name, a who attached to it, is 
meaningless’ (Arendt, 1998: 181). Again, the body is part of a homogeneous, even 
dehumanised realm (material realm, social group), whereas the individual has a capacity 
for pluralism. The ‘what’ represents an attempt to stabilise meaning, whereas the ‘who’ 
has the opposite tendency (Zerilli, 1995: 187). In politics, the material body should not 
matter, but ‘the world’ that we give form to (see Honig, 1995: 142). In the words of 
Bonnie Honig, ‘Arendt’s actors do not act because of what they already are, their actions 
do not express a prior, stable identity; they presuppose an unstable, multiple self that 
seeks its, at best, episodic self-realisation in action and in the identity that is its reward’ 
(Honig, 1995: 141).  
 
At this point, it is, again, interesting to undertake a comparison between Arendt and 
Bataille’s take on action. For both authors, action promises great things, but ultimately 
fails to live up to its potential. For Bataille, action is ultimately an illusion, an impotent 
fantasy, only transforming one’s dreams ‘on the level of the poorest reality’ (1985: 226). 
This is because action is limited by material dynamics: it does not respect human 
dynamics and thus limits actors to ‘follow that which exists’ (1985: 226-227). In contrast 
to Bataille, Arendt views action as limited by human dynamics. The fact that we cannot 
escape anthropocentrism and, with this, attaching our own meaning, anything can be 
given meaning and can be put into ‘meaningful action’:  
 
‘The totalitarian systems tend to demonstrate that action can be based on any 
hypothesis and that, in the course of consistently guided action, the particular 
hypothesis will become true, will become actual, factual reality. The assumption 
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which underlies consistent action can be as mad as it pleases; it will always end 
in producing facts which are then ‘objectively’ true’’ (2006: 87). 
 
However, despite being perversely volatile and ‘in and by itself utterly futile’, action has 
more potential, because it is unpredictable (2006: 60). Action ultimately cannot be 
directed, because of the many interactions it is subjected to. This is at once a failure and 
a possibility: while unpredictability prevents targeted action, it also creates space for 
new things to happen (op.cit.).  
 
Interestingly, when it comes to handling matter or ‘acting into nature’, Arendt is more 
pessimistic. As human unpredictability is brought to bear on the natural realm and its 
laws, only great disaster can result (2006: 61). Again, Arendt is more concerned with the 
thoughtless instrumentalisation of things than with the romantic preservation of a 
pristine nature (2006: 63). As action increasingly dominates over thought and 
contemplation (2006: 62), Arendt cautions that more awareness needs to be created 
not only of the kinds of processes humans put into motion, but of the reasons for which 
they are put in motion (2006: 62-63). Here, worldliness enters as a cultural and political 
process that organises in the face of (material and social) limitlessness, passivity and 
apparent disorganisation (see Roodt, 2005: 56; Pitkin, 1998: 97). Worldliness expresses 
a desire to participate in the ‘worldly space’ and in the maintenance of humanity against 
a ‘thoughtless’ state (see Roodt, 2005: 53). The care of the world supersedes the care of 
the self (see Bowen Moore 1989: 143).  
 
In some sense, worldliness can bee seen as a means of empowerment. As Roodt 
observes, one of Arendt’s aims is ‘to get away from the destructive notion that the 
world has − or should have − a moral meaning’ (2005: 161). How the world was or is 
should not matter – it only leads to feelings of powerlessness (Roodt, 2005: 161). This 
also seems true for Arendt’s ‘earth’. To embrace worldliness is not to refrain from 
reading the world, or from reading matter, but to be attentive to readings and to wish 
to change them if they feel destructive of the world – in Arendt’s case, it is the world as 
a space of free, pluralistic discourse that needs to be protected. 
 
Thinking about worldliness in this way does not illuminate why concepts of matter are 
important as part of academic or political discourse. First of all, worldliness expresses a 
profound distrust of matter and a desire for order. Worldliness must be both about 
keeping material excess and social chaos in check. Maintaining one’s place in the world 
requires constant vigilance, so that one does not end up ‘worldless’ or merely part of 
the natural world. Although worldliness constitutes the foundation of human activity in 
that it is about common care for ‘what lies between people’, there seems to be no room 
for safely admitting matter other than as an outside or interspace. ‘To live together in 
the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in 
common, as the table is located between those who sit around it, the world like every 
in-between relates and separates men at the same time’ (Arendt, 1998: 52). The worst a 
person can do is to become (or designate fellow humans as) ‘mere matter’ – for Arendt, 
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exemplified in the figure of Adolf Eichmann, the high ranking Nazi who she believed to 
have committed an ‘administrative massacre’ by blindly following orders.  
 
At the same time, worldliness is in itself a concept that emerges from a particular 
conception of matter – a conceptualisation that enables, but, in Arendt’s case, also 
prevents certain engagements with both the material and interhuman world that 
geographers are dealing with. In fact, its banishing of matter may make it more and not 
less liable to lead to dehumanisation. As I will try to show in the next section, in order 
not to lead to questionable outcomes, worldliness requires a sensitivity to the kinds of 
matter and the kinds of boundaries that are continuously being produced – matter is 
never just a primary, reliable externality. In the next section, I will try to specify how a 
reading through worldliness can help draw out particular problems as well as benefits of 
materialist readings, and I will also try to argue for a continued importance of an 
attention to matter.  
 
3 Worldliness’ blind spots and their reproduction 
 
If worldliness represents a process of common sense-making of the world, particular 
kind of questions follow for materialist approaches. These concern the connection 
between matter and what kind of work particular readings of matter do in the ‘worldly’ 
realm: what kinds of violence are committed or what kinds of possibilities are opened in 
particular representations of matter? An analysis of Arendt’s own reading of matter may 
serve as a warning and show why any application of ‘worldliness’ may need to be 
supplemented with other sensitivities to materialisation that have parallel anti-
oppressive projects such as feminism and postcolonialism. Cleansing the ‘world’ of 
matter is not without consequences. 
 
As Kathryn T. Gines and other feminist, especially black feminist philosophers have 
criticised, Arendt’s distinction between the political and the social - the social being 
materially tainted – is highly problematic. In her preference of immaterial over material 
relations, Arendt ends up excluding pressing social issues from the political realm, such 
as ‘economics, poverty, and racial oppression’ (Gines, 2007: 47). Worse, Arendt’s 
mistrust of material concerns poses barriers to who counts as an eligible participant in 
her world. Humans who, in Arendt’s view, seem too much ‘like a part of nature’, such as 
tribal people (interestingly, she includes Africans and settlers in this category), have not 
created, and are thus unable to partake in ‘a human world, a human reality’ (1973: 192). 
Similarly, refugees and stateless people disturb the world of ‘men’, because they have 
become reduced to ‘bare life’, to what is given to any human being by birth (1973a: 
301). They are particularly problematic, because they represent the breakdown of the 
natural/worldy boundary: the failure of political membership (citizenship) grounded in 
the natural category of birth (Borren, 2008: 215). Non-white people also present a 
problem, because they are seen as a racial category: their bodily visibility is too strong 
to overcome the designation of ‘what’.   
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Arendt’s aversion to naturalisation was originally intended to prevent misuse, such as an 
unproblematic reference to naturalised communities (Zerilli, 2011: 129) or to land grabs 
by settlers (Honig, 2016). At the same time, however, it sanctifies misuse in that ‘the 
physicality of certain forms of domination’ is completely ignored (Cocks, 1995: 243): 
entities are discriminated against on the basis of being subject to material needs and 
oppression. Worse, oppression is naturalised and blamed on the oppressed themselves 
(Gines, 2014: 96, 111). While it could be argued that Arendt merely describes such 
destructive processes as ‘the human condition’ – after all, the groups that she mentions 
are being dehumanised and discriminated - the kind of recommendations that Arendt 
issues seem to affirm that she, in fact, upholds the ideal of the matter-less world, 
without looking at the Euro-centrism and racism of its origins (see Ferreira da Silva, 
2007). As Arendt seeks to free politics from matter, her attention to destructive 
materialisation falters: rather than acting as a warning mechanism, it justifies oppressive 
hierarchies, including the destruction of the material world (including poor/non-Euro-
normative humans) as ‘resource’. What kinds of pluralism and intersubjectivity are 
created here or being protected?  
 
Yet an increased sensitivity to matter or its welcoming into the social or political realm 
does not automatically lead to less violent forms of ordering. In the materialist desire to 
perform ‘mind as matter’ to de-centre (new materialism) or re-centre (historical 
materialism) the human, the same problems as in Arendt’s ‘mind over matter’ structure 
continue to appear. Especially new materialism and its desire to ‘take [matter] seriously’ 
(Braun & Whatmore: 2010: ix) heavily relies on critiquing the split between nature and 
culture, usually blamed on René Descartes or European humanism (Braun and 
Whatmore, 2010: xi; Hawkins, 2010: 136; Latour, 2013; Whatmore, 1997: 45-46). This 
discomfort has resulted in a search for agency outside the human, as well as a 
redescription of the human as ‘not only human’ (e.g. Bennett, 2010: 116). Predictably, 
Arendt scholars have critiqued this move for its reliance on science or on nonhuman 
imaginaries to lead to positive political outcomes (Jones, 2013; Krause, 2015). There is 
anxiety that responsibility is being unhelpfully shifted through de-individualisation: an 
‘undifferentiated assignation of agency to matter’ (Jones, 2013). As Sharon Krause 
writes: ‘although the new materialism helps us understand the corporeal dimensions of 
individual agency and clarifies some dynamics of domination and oppression that are 
otherwise difficult to see, it often denies the importance of individuated identities and 
undercuts personal responsibility’ (2015: 21, 22).  
  
Generally, however, it is less the abnegation of individual responsibility that has come 
under fire, but the effects of the proposed new binaries. As Clive Barnett notes in his 
discussion of ontologies in geography, the rise of an ‘ontological register of theoretical 
argument’ has given rise to ‘abstract delimitations’, including discursive/material, 
human/nonhuman, representational/nonrepresentational, rational/’more-than-rational’ 
(2008: 187). While the mistrust of rationality, especially Western rationality, enables a 
recognition of materiality and material relations - even an inclusion of it in the category 
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of the ‘social’ – the human is often taken as homogenous matter and as always 
privileged, in these cases leaving a blindspot to inter-human inequality and already 
existing (violent forms of) objectification, for instance, to the ways in which people are 
forced to interact in destructive ways with other humans and nonhumans (White, 2013: 
679). To many postcolonial scholars, this blindness to intersubjective interaction also 
manifests in the new materialist discourse itself, in the form of non-recognition of non-
European ontologies and/or the necessity to validate non-European ontologies through 
European and (white) American theorists (Sundberg, 2014; Todd, 2016; Tolia-Kelly, 
2006; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012; Weheliye, 2014). Who is the ‘we’ that is not ‘taking this stuff 
seriously’?  
 
When it comes to ‘nonhumans’, something similar may be the case. As authors such as 
Graham Harman (2014) or Christian Thorne (2013) have argued, some political 
ontologies such as ‘thing theory’ are lacking an attention to specificities of relations or 
are merely adding characters to human power relations. This makes actors or objects 
essentially interchangeable (or subject-like) and ignores differences in distributions of 
agency. Papoulias and Callard (2010), by contrast, take issue with the kinds of matter 
that are being imported into certain new materialist theory. Often, what is being 
privileged is a matter that mirrors the authors’ political project, for instance, a ‘vision of 
nature with no fixity, one that can no longer be counted on to prop up calls to order, be 
they political or religious’ (Papoulias and Callard, 2010: 36). This privileging, again, can 
lead to an ‘environmental indeterminism’ that cannot engage with the hierarchical 
selections at the human scale.  
 
In this context, historical materialism, too, has come under scrutiny. Sylvia Wynter takes 
historical materialism to account for an over-reliance on re-organising production. For 
her, social hierarchies such as racism and sexism, inherent in the figure of ‘Man’ 
(humanity equated with the ideal of white bourgeois men), are not automatically 
contested through the proposed new handling of material necessities (Wynter in 
Wynter & McKittrick, 2015: 41, 51). Denise Ferreira da Silva, too, points to the 
problematic link between ‘the nature of individuals’ and ‘the material conditions 
determining their production’, especially as the desired conditions are modelled on a 
particular European political and economic development (2007: 189, 191). While she 
appreciates the experiments with scientific universality and materiality to produce a 
different kind of ontology, she feels that historical materialism does not go far enough in 
its challenge, ending up with a familiar version of self-consciousness and self-
determination (2007: 187). 
 
What the above analysis attempts to show is that both Arendtian and many 
contemporary materialist approaches are subject to familiar problems stemming from 
philosophical hierarchies, even if they represent attempts to challenge them. In Arendt’s 
case, worldliness is skewed towards the ‘mind over matter’ order, but it is also driven by 
the desire to re-order, and to acknowledge that a negotiation of materiality forms a 
necessary part of (human) life. While it is hard to agree with Arendt’s obsession with 
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human uniqueness and her problematic mode of individuation - despite its good 
intentions of overcoming the homogenisations of totalitarianisms, colonialism or social 
Darwinism - her interest in human materialisation is useful.  
 
What becomes increasingly evident, no matter what type of theory we are using, is that 
it is necessary to be attentive to how we draw boundaries between, and how we 
selectively elevate, different forms of matter and material processes. In Arendt’s case, it 
is the particular philosophical hierarchies that she draws on that pose a problem, 
namely, the imagination of a universal matter (and universal humanity) according to a 
particular tradition of European philosophy that has elevated a problematic relationship 
between interiority and exteriority to establish racial, gender and other hierarchies (see 
Ferreira da Silva, 2007 for an in-depth analysis13). The reliance on this tradition puts into 
perspective how much a difference the boundaries of a ‘world’ can make, as I will 
attempt to illustrate in the final part. Despite its shortcomings, the anti-totalitarian and 
anti-determinist origins of ‘worldliness’ can aid in the vigilance around the kinds of 
boundaries we are setting.  
 
4 Towards a different kind of worldliness?  
 
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt blames scientists for usurping the capacity for 
action in detrimental ways by ‘extinguishing the time-honoured protective dividing line 
between nature and the human world’ (1998: 324). In a different passage, Arendt points 
to the village walls that kept humans and nature apart in ancient and medieval times – a 
division that is being obliterated, in her opinion, to catastrophic effects by modern 
urban planning (2006: 279). For her, matter must be kept at bay at all costs for humans 
not to turn into things themselves. It is what turned Marxism into totalitarianism, 
modernity into a system that objectifies humanity and fascism into a popular ideology. 
Given Arendt’s first-hand experience of sudden loss of a ‘common world’ and the rise of 
a new, strange and powerful science, capable of obliterating humanity, her conclusion is 
understandable: people cannot handle matter. However, given Arendt’s description of 
what she is concerned about – alienation, dehumanisation, turn to totalitarian systems 
– it could be argued that the problem she diagnoses is not an encroachment of matter, 
but a suppression of matter.   
 
As an example, I would like to turn to Achille Mbembe’s Critique de la Raison Nègre (in 
translation as Critique of Black Reason). In his discussion of the nonhuman, Mbembe 
presents what could be regarded as an inversion of Arendt’s matter-sanitised world, set 
against the double (and intertwined) catastrophe of environmental destruction and 
human inequalities: 
 
‘And so it is all of humanity that bestows its name upon the world. In bestowing 
its name upon the world, it delegates itself to it and receives from it the 
confirmation of its proper place, singular but fragile, vulnerable and partial, at 
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least with regard to other forces of the universe – animals and vegetation, 
objects, molecules, divinities, techniques, materials, the shaking ground, the 
volcanoes that light up, the wind and the storms, the waters that rise, the sun 
that erupts and burns and so on and so forth. So there is only a world through 
naming [nomination], delegation, mutuality and reciprocity.’ (…) 
‘But if the whole of humanity delegates itself into the world and receives the 
final confirmation of its proper being as well as of its fragility, then the difference 
between the human and the nonhuman world is nothing more than a external 
difference.’ (…) 
‘In opposing itself to the nonhuman world, humanity opposes itself.’ (Mbembe, 
2013: 258).  
 
As with Arendt, the way this can be read is that, through our physical make-up, we 
cannot separate ourselves from anything in this world on the material level; we can only 
do this on the representational level. Mbembe’s emphasis on the material condition of 
representation, however, prevents the possibility of separation, since such a separation 
amounts to self-destruction or, at least, self-harm14. Whereas Arendt would read self-
destruction as a consequence of a collapse of human-nonhuman distinctions, Mbembe 
argues, following Glissant’s image of the ‘tout monde’ (a global plurality in interaction), 
that it is the border-maintenance that is our demise. For not only does it endanger our 
physical existence, but our political one as well, as our on-going exclusions strategically 
turn large sections of the global populations into objects: ‘man-thing’ (2013: 14), ‘man-
merchandise, man-metal, man-money’ (2013: 258). Where Arendt’s boundaries would 
almost certainly present a hopeless scenario of natural instability equalling political 
impossibility, Mbembe’s attempted dissolution of boundaries presents a possibility to 
find a common world through the realisation of material commonality.  
 
In theory, this is the point where historical and new materialisms seek to intervene by 
pushing for an admittance of matter into the sphere of politics, so that boundaries can 
be re-examined, shifted or dissolved. Normally, the quest of materialism has been to 
find other ways of relating, in the face of a being alienated ‘both from nature and from a 
universal humanity’ (Barta, 2007: 88). Materialisms can help through emphasising the 
shared materiality, as well as the link between social inequalities and environmental and 
eventual destruction. At the same time, both types of materialisms can benefit from a 
dialogue with ‘worldliness’. Despite, or in some ways because of Arendt’s phobia of 
matter, her concept raises important questions about individuality, plurality and the 
location of agency in the face of dehumanisation. Although materialisms are often 
aware of the risk of conflating deindividuation with dehumanisation, a sharpening of 
sensitivity towards this danger is useful. Of materialisms, Arendt’s ‘worldliness’ seems to 
be asking: how can a different kind of plurality be brought into being that admits what 
has previously been excluded, and that does not end up contributing to harmful 
dehumanisations?  
Some materialisms are better at negotiating the dehumanisation than others. Especially 
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materialisms with feminist and anti-racist origins have a highly developed sensitivity for 
this problem, since they have emerged from an opposition to dehumanisation. Other 
materialisms are explicitly refusing an engagement with human inequality and 
difference, since these issues are regarded as a return to the harmful individualisation – 
often framed as anthropocentrism - that needs to be overcome, tied to the illusion of 
human exceptionalism and individual agency. While there are different ways of dealing 
with dehumanisation, some of which embrace it as a strategy of destabilisation and 
disillusionment (see Colebrook, 2011: 14), the question of how individual agency 
remains. How much does the individual constitute a ‘persistent possibility of… 
disruption and rearticulation’? (Butler, 1993: xvii) in the context of distributed (material) 
individuality?  
Here, worldliness performs a sensitisation to two potential pitfalls of deindividuation. 
First, it cautions against a turn to de-individualisation that ends up being more 
individualist than whatever was the subject of critique. As Julie Torrant (2014) explains 
in her historical materialist critique of Grosz and Braidotti, new materialist feminisms 
are in danger of becoming ‘forms of spiritualism’ that turn critique of wider 
dehumanising structures into individual coping strategies or a reification of ‘sense 
experience’. While one may not agree with all of her accusations, she draws out a 
pertinent issue that can potentially relate to all materialisms, given the difficulty to think 
beyond oneself. Even if we conceptually allow all of matter in, this ‘matterism’ (Ebert, 
2009) does not automatically lead to an improved common world. In order for a ‘care 
for the world’ to be established, others need to be involved beyond their individual 
material presence.  
Second, to materialisms that are seeking an expansion of what is human, an expansion 
of who or what can act, or a new kind of material hierarchy, ‘worldliness’ poses the 
challenge of how to negotiate the individual other than as a generic category. 
‘Worldliness’ seems to both advocate for individuation (to prevent dehumanisation, to 
further agonistic relations) but also warns about the potential pitfalls of individuation 
(as a divorce from the rest of the world). Especially in geography, where we necessarily 
need to handle larger categories such as ‘humans’, ‘animals’, ‘environment’ to talk 
about current issues, thinking about materiality and individuality together can often be 
challenging. Moreover, thinking in such categories can often lead to the frustrating 
feeling of a lack of possibilities for change and intervention in what looks like an 
inevitable path. Here, using ‘worldliness’s’ movement towards individuation can aid not 
only as a source of hopeful unpredictability, but also as a reminder of why we desire the 
deindividuation-drive of materialism even as we are fighting dehumanisation. It reminds 
us of the fact that, while matter is indifferent, we, as human individuals, together, can 
choose to materialise in different ways. 
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2 I am aware that ‘new materialism(s)’ is a contested term that is resisted by many who 
are labelled as such. In this article, I use ‘new materialisms’ in the temporal sense: they 
include any contemporary attempts to re-envision materialism as something other than 
(just) historical materialism. I thus pull together theories as diverse as actor-network 
theory, agential realism, object orientated ontology, posthumanism etc.  
3 ‘Matter’ in this article is defined as that what is perceived as having physical substance. 
It is also assumed that matter is always ‘read’ or interpreted by humans, and that these 
readings are culturally or ideologically influenced, but can be contested.  
4 The impact of ‘new materialism’ on art and vice versa, has also recently been criticised 
in the latest ‘A Questionnaire on Materialisms’ special of the journal October, where 
Emily Apter, following Hito Steyerl, diagnoses an increasing expectation of the 
materially expanded artworld as ‘sensory industry’ (2016). In geography, there have also 
been instances where military funding or technologies were used as part of especially 
affect based research and engagement. This issue has mostly been raised by audiences 
at conferences, for instance, at the ‘Feeling the Anthropocene: Air, Rock, Flesh’ seminar 
(28 November 2014, University of Edinburgh) or the ‘Plasticities’ sessions at the RGS-IBG 
Annual Conference 2011.  
8 Arendt was influenced by thinkers such as Aristotle, Kant, Niezsche, Heidegger and 
Jaspers. The concept of worldliness is considered strongly influenced by Heidegger (e.g. 
on the question of meaning, care for the world, focus on the individual), but also 
differing from his philosophy (emphasis on public space and communication, 
theorization of difference and thinking, opposing visions and uses of nature, labour, art) 
(Kristeva, 2011: 197; Swift, 2009: 45-54). 
9 Vasti Roodt has summed up this nested vision as follows: ‘Arendt investigates the 
interplay of conditions and capabilities whereby we have become − and are perpetually 
becoming − who we are. The particular conditions Arendt identifies are: the earth, 
which is the habitat in which we, along with all organic life, are able to “move and 
breathe without effort and without artifice” [Arendt, 1998:  2]; life itself, which is the 
biological process that is part of the general metabolism of nature, and which we share 
with all living things; worldliness, the condition of belonging to a world “which separates 
human existence from all mere animal environment” [Arendt, 1998:  2]; birth and death, 
or natality and mortality, understood as our appearance in and eventual disappearance 
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from this human world; and finally, the condition of plurality: “the fact that men, not 
Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” [Arendt, 1998:  7]’ (Roodt, 2005: 119). 
10 Arendt also criticized Marx’ reliance on utilitarianism: ‘utility established as meaning 
creates meaninglessness’ (Arendt, 1998: 154). 
11 ‘Materialism will be seen as a senile idealism to the extent that it is not immediately 
based on psychological or social facts, instead of on artificially isolated physical 
phenomena. Thus it is from Freud, among others – rather than from long-dead 
physicists, whose ideas today have no meaning – that a representation of matter must 
be taken’ (Bataille, 1985: 15). 
13 As Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007) shows in her analysis of European intellectual 
history in philosophy and natural science, thinkers have gone against the core of their 
own theories to de-classify non-‘Caucasians’ as non-human. 
14 In line with the nascent field of ‘geophilosophy’ and related philosophical discussions, 
this provocation could be taken further: how to think (or read) if thinking is self-
destructive at its core? I am thinking here of Manabrata Guha’s question (following 
military strategist Carl von Clausewitz): ‘How to think when thinking is chaotic at its 
core?’ (2010: 333) 
 
